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The theory of event coding (TEC) as
embodied-cognition framework
Bernhard Hommel*
Cognitive Psychology Unit, Institute of Psychology, Leiden Institute for Brain and Cognition, Leiden University, Leiden,
Netherlands
The concept of embodied cognition attracts enormous interest but neither is the
concept particularly well-defined nor is the related research guided by systematic
theorizing. To improve this situation the theory of event coding (TEC) is suggested
as a suitable theoretical framework for theorizing about cognitive embodiment—
which, however, presupposes giving up the anti-cognitivistic attitude inherent in many
embodiment approaches. The article discusses the embodiment-related potential of
TEC, and the way and degree to which it addresses Wilson’s (2002) six meanings of the
embodiment concept. In particular, it is discussed how TEC considers human cognition
to be situated, distributed, and body-based, how it deals with time pressure, how it
delegates work to the environment, and in which sense it subserves action.
Keywords: embodied cognition theory, cognitivism, perception and action, distributed cognition, human
cognition, theory, perception for action
The general intuition that human cognition is somehow “embodied” is widely shared and
has stimulated various new brands of research. And yet, the concept of embodied cognition
is ill-deﬁned and a general, testable theory of its underlying mechanisms has not yet been
presented. This has rendered tests of the concept diﬃcult and often metaphorical in nature,
which stands in the way of broader acceptance. The main reason for that, so I claim,
is the anti-cognitivistic attitude of most embodiment approaches. Not only is this attitude
more rooted in ideology than in empirical data, but it also prevents embodiment approaches
from using cognitivistic tools to build mechanistic theories that provide the badly needed
testable hypotheses. In the following, I shall argue that some cognitivistic approaches are
well-equipped to capture the essence of cognitive embodiment. In particular, I shall argue
that the theory of event coding (TEC; Hommel et al., 2001a) provides almost all that
embodiment theories need, and that it therefore provides a mechanistic approach to the
embodied-cognition concept—which TEC fully embraces. I shall demonstrate that by going
through the six diﬀerent meanings of embodied cognition that Wilson (2002) has identiﬁed
in the literature, and explain how TEC ﬁts with (the unideological aspects of) these six
meanings.
The Theory of Event Coding
Theory of event coding is rooted in the cognitivistic ideomotor approaches of Lotze (1852),
Harless (1861), and James (1890), and yet embraces the idea that human cognition emerges
from sensorimotor processing. In contrast to behavioristic or information-processing approaches,
ideomotor theory considers humans as active agents that perform actions to reach particular
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goals. Accordingly, the theoretical analysis does not start
with stimuli but with goals (intended action eﬀects), which
are assumed to trigger the execution of movements suited
to reach them. Goals are acquired by actively exploring the
environment, which creates associations betweenmotor activities
and representations of their perceptual consequences (Elsner and
Hommel, 2001). These action-eﬀect bindings provide the basis
for voluntary action: the agent only needs to “think of” the
representation of a wanted action eﬀect to activate the motor
pattern needed to produce it (for overviews, see Hommel, 2009;
Shin et al., 2010)—see Figure 1. Indeed, planning to produce
particular action outcomes (e.g., hand movements or facial
expressions) activates the neural codes of these consequences
(areas EBR and FFA, respectively) before execution begins (Kühn
et al., 2011).
Theory of event coding combines the ideomotor mechanism
with assumptions about how perceptual and action events
are represented. In particular, TEC comprises of four basic
assumptions (Hommel et al., 2001a): (I) Perceptual events and
planned actions are cognitively represented by event codes; (II)
which are integrated assemblies of feature codes; (III) which in
turn are cognitive/brain states correlated with external (perceived
or self-generated) features (distal coding); (IV) so that the basic
units of both perception and action (assemblies of feature codes)
are sensorimotor entities, in the sense that they are activated
by sensory input (=perception) and controlling motor output
(=action).
What does it mean, from a TEC point of view, that cognition
is embodied? As mentioned already, this depends on which sense
of cognitive embodiment one refers to. According to Wilson
(2002), at least six diﬀerent meanings can be distinguished. In the
following, I shall brieﬂy introduce each of these criteria, carve out
their less ideological essence, and show how they are met by TEC.
For a broader, more detailed discussion, see Hommel (2015).
FIGURE 1 | James’ (1890, p. 582) neural model of acquiring
ideomotor control. Random activation of motor units (M) leads to
non-voluntary motor activity (motor babbling), which in turn produces
external effects (changes in body, environment, and body-environment
relationship) that are registered by sensitive receptors (e.g., K—a
kinesthetic receptor). Frequent co-activation of motor patterns (M) and
receptors picking up the thereby produced re-afferent information (K) will
lead to bidirectional associations between the two (M↔K). As a
consequence, the motor pattern can be controlled/activated by
endogenously re-activating the sensory part—i.e., by just “thinking of” or
imagining a wanted sensory action effect. That is, internal reactivation of K
(or codes of another sensory modality) serves to control M.
Situated Cognition
The idea that cognitive activity is always situated and taking place
in a particular context comes in two diﬀerent ﬂavors (Wilson,
2002). One relates to the philosophical/pedagogical claim that
knowing is inseparable from doing, which is why education
should favor learning-by-doing over the passive accumulation
of knowledge (e.g., Greeno, 1998). This approach emphasizes
the role of active agency in knowledge acquisition and internal
representation—exactly as proposed by ideomotor theory and
TEC. The ideomotor approach does not merely presume the
existence of action goals or particular knowledge to account
for voluntary action, but explains how goals are acquired
through concrete hands-on exploration of one’s own body and
its interactions with the environment (Verschoor et al., 2010).
TEC extends this mechanism to a general theory of human
cognition and claims that humans do not just acquire action goals
through sensorimotor experience but that most or all knowledge
is rooted in sensorimotor experience. It therefore seems to
ﬁt perfectly with the philosophical/pedagogical embodiment
concept.
The other ﬂavor of situated cognition comes from cognitive
robotics (e.g., Clancey, 1997) and claims that agents may often
not require internal information but can simply pick it up from
their environment—which obviously borrows from Gibsonian
Ecological Psychology and the assumption that environments
provide action-related aﬀordances for the active perceiver
(Gibson, 1979). On the one hand, it is uncontroversial that
humans and other primates possess (dorsal) online information-
processing channels that feed more or less directly into action
systems (Milner and Goodale, 2006), which may be considered
a system that processes aﬀordances (Michaels, 2000). On the
other hand, however, there is no evidence that voluntary
actions can be planned and carried out successfully without
the help of other (ventral) oﬀ-line channels devoted to object
identiﬁcation, planning, and action evaluation—processes that
rely on memory, which even in the case of procedural knowledge
can be considered to represent past experiences.
It is this second oﬀ-line system responsible for setting
up and planning voluntary actions that TEC is concerned
with, while the theory has little to say about the subserving
online channels (Hommel et al., 2001b). However, almost all
of our everyday actions rely on previously acquired knowledge
about how to use the available tools to reach our goals—just
think of using a computer or coﬀee machine, or engaging in
verbal communication and socially appropriate behavior. And
they are often planned ahead in the absence of situational
cues—which falls outside of the scope of (neo-) classical
aﬀordance-based approaches. As many actions require, or
beneﬁt from, the integration of knowledge-dependent oﬀ-line
processes, and environmentally driven online processes, they
can be considered goal-directed and context-sensitive at the
same time. Accordingly, it makes sense to try integrating
cognitivistic ideomotor theory and aﬀordance-based approaches
(Glover, 2004) rather than putting them into opposition—as
some situated-cognition approaches tend to do (e.g., Pfeifer and
Bongard, 2006).
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Cognition under Time Pressure
This brand of the embodied-cognition concept assumes that
engaging in cognitive activities is particularly time costly and
therefore unlikely to be the basis of everyday action. In
cognitive robotics, this idea has been taken to suggest dropping
the cognitive overhead so to allow robots to meet real-time
constraints (e.g., Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999), and reasoning
theorists (e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 1999) have used it to argue
that people prefer cognitive shortcuts over full-ﬂedged cognitive
analyses of a problem.
One can argue whether time pressure is a real problem in
humans: not only are there few everyday situations that would
not allow taking the time for fuller cognitive analysis, but nature
has also equipped us with reﬂexes that allow engaging in ﬁght or
ﬂight long before grasping the actual situational demands. Hence,
survival seems possible with the human mix of slow cognition
and fast reﬂexes.
But what is more, theoretical analysis and empirical evidence
suggest that slow cognition does not intervene between
perception and action even if time allows (Hommel, 2013).
Indeed, the main purpose of cognition seems to consist in
anticipatory (oﬄine) preparation: selecting a goal, conﬁguring
the system for a particular task, priming goal-relevant action
systems, and preparing for the processing of possible trigger
stimuli. It is these preparatory processes that TEC is targeting.
Once an action has been selected and suﬃciently prepared,
not much cognitive activity seems to go on and environmental
information will commonly suﬃce to drive the action to
completion—a kind of prepared reﬂex (Hommel, 2000). If, thus,
cognition is not for online control but for oﬀ-line preparation,
the possible slowness of cognitive processes does not serve as an
argument against cognitivistic approaches and not even against
(properly programmed) cognitive robots.
Offloading Cognitive Work onto the
Environment
This blend of the embodiment approach tries to reduce the
amount of knowledge that agents need to process. It assumes that
the environment can serve as its ownmemory (e.g., Brooks, 1991;
O’Regan and Noe, 2001), so that agents do not need to develop
internal world models. Interestingly, supporting evidence comes
exclusively from spatial tasks (Wilson, 2002), and it certainly
makes sense that spatial decisions consider available spatial
information. It is less clear how oﬄoading might work with
actions like talking, dancing, or writing an article, but this
may be the reason why the available evidence is restricted to
less knowledge-heavy spatial actions. In any case, the model-
less embodiment approach is fully consistent with TEC, which
does not assume that actions rely on world models. While
TEC aims to explain how people are planning goal-directed
actions (based on procedural, implicit knowledge gathered
through active experience), it does not claim that all aspects of
actions are predetermined by planning. It rather assumes that
planning is restricted to the speciﬁcation of goal-relevant action
outcomes (e.g., of the cup to be grasped for drinking), while the
speciﬁcation of goal-unrelated action features (e.g., the particular
kinematics) is left to environmentally driven online channels
that continuously feed in information during action execution
(Hommel, 2010).
Distributed Cognition
The claim that human cognition is not restricted to an
individual’s mind and brain but involves the environment as
well (e.g., Wilson and Golonka, 2013) can be considered another
revival of a theme with a much older history (e.g., interactionism
in personality psychology). According toWilson (2002) the claim
actually consists of two parts: that including the environment in
analyses of human cognition provides more information than
excluding it—which is true but too trivial to be controversial—
and that excluding the environment from the analysis does
not allow for any interesting insight into human cognition in
principle.
It must be said that the distributed-cognition criterion has
not yet been supported by any speciﬁc evidence. Neither has
it been deﬁned which aspects of the environment actually
count (e.g., if a symbol on the monitor is enough, almost all
cognitive research does take the environment into account),
nor has it been demonstrated that, and in which sense the
available cognitive/neurocognitive research has failed to produce
meaningful results, nor has the approach itself produced any
speciﬁc evidence to its own support—all the evidence that
proponents tend to discuss was motivated by other than the
distributed-cognition approach (e.g., see Wilson and Golonka,
2013). Hence, even the few observations in the literature that
distributed-cognition proponents do ﬁnd relevant did not require
the distributed-cognition approach to make them.
However, a more liberal interpretation of the approach might
get close to the situated-cognition criterion, and thus rightly
attract attention to the relevance of concrete sensorimotor
experience of the agent with his or her environment. This
approach would make TEC and its reliance on sensorimotor
experience a valuable tool to go beyond abstract complaints, and
allow for the empirical test of concrete hypotheses about concrete
phenomena.
Cognition Subserves Action
The claim that human cognition evolved to subserve action
has considerable Darwinistic face value: evolution operates on
actions, not on ideas. It is therefore not surprising that cognition-
for-action has been a dominant theme in many approaches,
including American pragmatism, behaviorism, Russian activity
theory, the motor theory of speech, and the mirror neuron
approach. The concept also represents the very core of TEC,
which partly reﬂects its intellectual heritage. And yet, the
architectural and process-related assumptions underlying TEC
make it unique in the ﬁeld in a number of ways.
Theory of event coding shares the idea of cognition-for-action
with respect to phylogenetic and ontogenetic considerations:
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the neural/functional architecture underlying the distribution
of labor between dorsal and ventral information-processing
streams is likely to reﬂect the importance of action in
evolution and, as explained already, ontogenetic cognitive
development relies on sensorimotor experience. However, TEC
diﬀers from other approaches in denying that every single use of
cognitive skill or content must be accompanied by sensorimotor
activity—as embodied-cognition proponents like Gallese and
Goldman (1998) or Barsalou (2008) suggest (which is not to
deny that these approaches share many other aspects with
TEC).
One reason why cognition without sensorimotor activity
or mental simulation should be possible relates to TECs
intentional-weighting principle (Memelink and Hommel, 2013).
TEC assumes that perceived or to-be-produced events are
represented by means of event ﬁles—integrated bindings of the
codes of distal event features (Hommel, 2004). The contribution
of each component of such a binding is assumed to be
weighted according to its situational relevance, so that codes
related to the ringing sound of a telephone will be weighted
more strongly than codes related to its color when waiting
for a call. This means that event representations are tailored
to the goal and task at hand, which implies that not all
components of the representation are suﬃciently activated to
contribute to cognition and action. This means that, even
though most cognitive representations are likely to comprise of
both perceptual and action components, cognitive operations
using these representations are possible without above-threshold
activation of some components. If, thus, the cognitive operations
do not require overt action (e.g., when processing words for
silent reading), it is possible that they are carried out without
measurable motor activity. In other words, sensorimotor activity
is important for creating cognitive representations but not
necessarily for using them.
The other reason is that grounding basic cognitive units in
sensorimotor experience, as TEC assumes, does not necessarily
prevent the creation of other representations that refer to
combinations of, or relations between, such basic units. For
instance, there is no reason to exclude that people are able to
combine the (sensorimotorically grounded) representation of
a horse with the (sensorimotorically grounded) representation
of a horn to create the representation of a unicorn without
ever having sensorimotorically experienced one. According
to TEC, the resulting representations may be considered
abstract but not necessarily symbolic or arbitrary, and they
still can be considered as being grounded in sensorimotor
experience.
Body-Based Cognition for Off-Line Use
The claim refers to the idea that cognitive structures or
skills that emerged through sensorimotor interactions with
the environment could be used oﬀ-line—in the absence of
overt behavior—to subserve cognitive activities (e.g., Glenberg,
1997). This claim also has a rather long history, especially in
Russian activity theory (e.g., Vygotsky, 1962) and approaches
that conceive of cognition as interiorized action. TEC fails to
provide a systematic scenario of how interiorization might work
in detail (and there is in fact no such theory available), but it
does provide the necessary cognitive infrastructure. As explained
already, TEC assumes that overt sensorimotor action leads to
the binding of motor patterns and codes representing their
consequences. Acquiring these bindings allows the agent to run
them internally to simulate the action without actually activating
the motor patterns (if intentional weighting deactivates the motor
components). The acquisition of multiple sensorimotor events
allows the agent to construct more complex event sequences,
such as for making coﬀee (Kachergis et al., 2014). These
representations provide information about how to move from
one situation to another to reach a distant goal, which can be
used to simulate and to compare alternative problem-solving
strategies.
Conclusion
Many embodied-cognition approaches have been put forward
with a strong anti-cognitivistic attitude that they share with,
and in some cases borrow from, behaviorism, ecological
psychology, and evolutionary psychology, and indeed many
of the ecological, and evolutionary arguments have resurfaced
in the embodied-cognition debate (e.g., see Wilson and
Golonka, 2013). This is unfortunate for two reasons. For
one, most of these arguments are simply misdirected: they
mainly challenge the symbol-heavy good old-fashioned artiﬁcial
intelligence, which, however, had only negligible impact on
modern cognitive psychology/neuroscience. And, for another,
rejecting cognitivism prevents embodied-cognition theorists to
develop mechanistic and therefore testable models that allow
them to explore how fruitful the embodiment approach actually
is. Without such models, no direct comparison with non-
embodied approaches is possible, and thus no competition
for the better explanation on cognitive psychology’s to-do list.
Cherry-picking examples that minimize cognitive processes,
knowledge, and internal preparation may help to illustrate basic
principles, but scientiﬁc approaches to human cognition that
are unable to account for everyday actions like making a phone
call, preparing coﬀee, or asking for directions are unlikely to
succeed.
I propose that a more constructive approach to embodied
cognition is possible and probably more successful. As I
have argued, a cognitivistic approach to the relationship
between perception and action is likely to be useful
for that purpose. In particular, the TEC is theoretically
commensurable with all six of Wilson’s (2002) meanings
of the embodiment concept. TEC assumes the existence of
internal representations and claims that such representations
are involved in producing actions, which makes it a cognitivistic
approach. At the same time, it does not only assume that
human cognition is situated, distributed, and body-based, but
also explains how; it also explains how cognition deals with
time pressure, how it is delegated to the environment, and
which sense it subserves action. Extensions of the theory are
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possible and wanted on the way to a truly comprehensive
framework of human cognition, and combining TEC with
mechanistic models of online/aﬀordance-based control and with
assumptions about interiorization seems particularly promising
in this respect.
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